India and the energy corridor
The conflict that began in the Gulf on 28 February 2026 has cost lives across the region, and its effects reached India through three fuels at once. Before the crisis, about 45% of India’s crude imports, about 90% of its LPG imports and 55–60% of its LNG imports passed through the Strait of Hormuz, according to RIS. India adjusted quickly: the World Bank reports that the share of crude imports routed outside the strait rose from about 55% to around 70%.
Rerouting bought time. ORF Middle East’s The Hormuz Inflection argues that lasting resilience needs a web of energy links between India, the Gulf and Europe, and that building it will take “years, if not decades”. For businesses in energy, infrastructure and industry, the gap between the fast fix and the slow build raises decisions about where to commit now. Those are the decisions to which Fractionova brings AI-native Opportunity Intelligence and principal-led judgement.
This perspective draws on ORF Middle East’s The Hormuz Inflection: Energy Security and Connectivity Networks in the Middle East (October 2026), by Mannat Jaspal, Leigh Mante and Cauvery Ganapathy, with RIS Discussion Paper 351, India’s Energy Security Challenges Amidst the West Asian Crisis and the Way Forward (October 2026), and the World Bank’s October 2026 India Development Update. Facts and judgements are attributed to their authors; the interpretation is Fractionova’s. Fractionova is not affiliated with ORF Middle East, the Observer Research Foundation, RIS or the World Bank.
Crude oil imports
LPG imports
LNG imports
Share of each fuel’s imports that passed through the strait before the crisis (RIS).
Since then, the share of crude imports routed outside Hormuz has risen from about 55% to around 70% (World Bank).
RIS and the World Bank describe a shock that reached households, industry and the public finances, and a response that moved faster than many expected.
RIS finds that about 45% of India’s crude imports transited the strait before the crisis. For LPG the exposure was greater: India imports around 60% of its LPG, and about 90% of those imports came through the strait, roughly 54% of all the LPG India uses. An estimated 55–60% of LNG imports took the same route.
RIS Discussion Paper 351, October 2026, pp. 5–6
India’s oil imports came to about US$134.7 billion in 2025–26. RIS reports that India paid 14.7% more for its crude imports in May 2026 than in April, and more than 22% more for LNG.
RIS Discussion Paper 351, October 2026, p. 10
The World Bank reports that India now sources crude from around 40 countries, and that the share of crude imports routed outside Hormuz rose from about 55% before the conflict to around 70%. Refineries raised LPG output by around 28% within days, and alternative LPG came from the United States, Norway, Canada, Algeria and Russia.
World Bank, India Development Update, October 2026, p. 9
The World Bank raised its forecast for India’s growth in FY27 to 7.1%, from 6.6% in April. It warns that a prolonged or intensifying conflict could keep oil prices elevated for longer, pressing on inflation, the current account and the public finances.
World Bank, India Development Update, October 2026, pp. 5–6
A note on the sources: ORF Middle East and RIS state that the views in their papers are their authors’. Figures from different publishers are attributed separately and not combined. Fractionova takes no position on the conflict.
ORF Middle East argues that the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) should become a web of networks rather than a single route, carrying electricity, hydrogen and its derivatives, gas, civil nuclear cooperation and critical minerals. Its proposals start from the part that already works.
ORF finds the India–Gulf shipping leg fully operational, while a 269-kilometre rail gap remains between the UAE and Saudi Arabia and the route onward through Jordan and Israel is incomplete. The UAE ports outside the strait, Fujairah and Khor Fakkan, have risen in prominence since the war. India–UAE trade reached US$101.25 billion in 2025–26, and the two governments have raised their target to US$200 billion by 2032.
ORF Middle East, The Hormuz Inflection, October 2026, pp. 13, 15, 19
India has agreed with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to explore subsea power links of about 1,700 kilometres and 1,400 kilometres, and a similar link with Oman is being explored. ORF reports an initial phase of 3 GW, rising to almost 20 GW over the next decade, with feasibility studies under way. It argues that each country should secure its baseload at home and use cross-border power for peaks, emergencies and specific industrial loads.
ORF Middle East, The Hormuz Inflection, October 2026, pp. 24, 27
After the conflict, ORF reports, Indian fertiliser makers locked in additional long-term contracts for green ammonia. Yet as of August 2025 only 2.8% of India’s green hydrogen projects were operational, and 94% of planned capacity had not passed the announcement stage.
ORF Middle East, The Hormuz Inflection, October 2026, pp. 37, 41
RIS lists what India and the UAE agreed in May 2026: ADNOC will store up to 30 million barrels of crude in Indian facilities, and IOCL, GAIL and HPCL signed long-term LNG contracts with ADNOC Gas totalling 4.5 million tonnes a year. The UAE is India’s largest source of LPG. RIS also describes Oman as a strategic gateway beyond Hormuz; the India–Oman free trade agreement came into force on 1 June 2026.
RIS Discussion Paper 351, October 2026, pp. 8–9, 19–20
Read together, the reports describe two clocks.
RIS’s own agenda spans both clocks: expand strategic reserves from about 74 days of cover towards 90–100 days, add more than 50 GW of renewable capacity a year and raise nuclear capacity to 22.38 GW by 2031–32. For a business, the commercial question sits between the clocks: what to commit to now, on routes that already work, and what to hold as an option on routes that may not be built for years.
A finding matters commercially when it is connected to a specific business. For a company that supplies equipment, services or capital to energy and industrial projects between India and the Gulf, these are the questions Fractionova would put first, organised by the dimension of the opportunity they affect.
Technology & capability
ORF’s proposals span power links, storage, hydrogen and ammonia, gas, nuclear and minerals, each with its own technologies and timelines.
Which part of the corridor does our capability serve, and how soon will that part be built?
Customer demand
Indian fertiliser makers have signed long-term green ammonia contracts, while most of India’s announced green hydrogen capacity had not passed the announcement stage in 2025, according to ORF.
Where is demand for our product contracted, and where is it only announced?
Partners & counterparties
ORF sees Gulf sovereign funds such as PIF, Mubadala and ADQ as well placed to anchor corridor financing, and proposes a joint India–UAE secretariat with a single window for investors.
Which developer, fund or state company is our route into these projects?
Economics & commercial potential
ORF points to high upfront costs, long paybacks and the open question of who pays for cross-border cables. It suggests long-term offtake and power purchase agreements, guarantees, and green bonds or sukuk to make projects bankable.
What contract structure would make our part of a project bankable?
Policy & geostrategic conditions
Electricity markets are organised differently across the corridor, and ORF notes that EU carbon-border and hydrogen rules complicate exports from India and the Gulf. RIS adds the risk of new dependence on imported critical minerals and technology.
Which rules decide whether our product or energy can cross the border, and where are we exposed?
Timing & market readiness
India–Gulf shipping works today; most of the corridor beyond it is years away. The World Bank’s outlook assumes oil markets return to pre-conflict conditions by early 2027. Our perspective on Gulf trade shows how the region’s ports absorbed diverted cargo.
What should we commit to the India–UAE leg now, and what should wait for the rest of the corridor?
The reports are useful evidence and an incomplete basis for a commercial decision. Four limits matter.
Those gaps are where a business decision is made: in which projects are financed, which demand is contracted and which rules apply at each border.
Bring the question in the form your board would ask it.
Which part of the energy corridor between India and the Gulf should we commit to first?
Which developers, funds and state companies should we qualify in India and the UAE?
Should we build, assemble or hold stock in the UAE to serve both markets?
Which border rules decide whether our product or energy can cross?
This is a hypothetical illustration, not a client engagement or a claim of achieved outcomes.
An Indian engineering company builds balance-of-plant for solar and battery-storage projects at home. A UAE developer has asked it to bid for Gulf projects, and a port operator is looking for partners on an energy terminal. Leadership needs to decide where its next commitment should go.
Fractionova’s AI engine would connect the projects in each market with their financing status, offtake and contract terms, partner requirements, local participation rules and timelines. Principal-led review would establish which route supports the next commitment and what evidence would justify it.
Deepen the home build-outGrow with India’s own solar and storage projects. The questions are margins, payment terms and how much of the market is already contracted.
Partner in the UAEBid for Gulf projects with a local partner. The questions are which partner, what share of the work and the capital at risk.
Position for corridor projectsPrepare for terminals, storage and grid links along the corridor. The questions are which projects reach financing, and when.
You do not need to choose a format first. The starting point is the decision your business needs to make.
Concentrated intelligence for a consequential choice.
A focused investigation around a defined decision, culminating in a decision brief with the recommended direction, unresolved questions and conditions for commitment.
For example: Decide whether to grow at home, partner in the UAE or position for projects along the corridor.
A coordinated mandate to develop market access and commercial relationships.
An integrated investigation into market priorities, entry structures and counterparties, with prioritised partners and preparation for engagement.
For example: Qualify the developers, funds and state companies behind energy projects in India and the UAE, and prepare engagement.
A retained intelligence capability around your strategic agenda.
Recurring investigation and monitoring, supported by agreed business context and structured principal-led reviews.
For example: Track corridor projects, energy agreements and shipping through Hormuz as conditions change.
Each engagement is commissioned against a defined business objective. Scope and fees reflect the analytical depth, market coverage, counterparty work and continuity required.
Founder & Principal Prabha Shankar leads the technical-commercial judgement behind Fractionova’s work. An engineer and international business specialist, he brings nearly three decades of experience across automotive engineering management, advanced mobility, new energy, international market development and complex programme execution.
At Fractionova, that experience shapes the questions put to the AI engine, the assumptions challenged during investigation and the commercial significance assigned to its findings.
Heavily, through three fuels. RIS finds that before the crisis about 45% of India’s crude imports, about 90% of its LPG imports and 55–60% of its LNG imports passed through the strait.
Quickly. The World Bank reports that India now sources crude from around 40 countries and that the share of crude imports routed outside Hormuz rose from about 55% to around 70%. Refineries raised LPG output by around 28% within days. According to RIS, India also signed new storage and LNG agreements with the UAE in May 2026.
A web of energy links between India, the Gulf and Europe, building on the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor: subsea power links, trade in hydrogen and green ammonia, gas, civil nuclear cooperation and critical minerals. ORF says it will take years, if not decades, and it starts from the India–UAE leg that already works.
The nearest opportunities sit on routes that already work, such as India–UAE shipping, and in demand that is already contracted. Most of the wider corridor is still proposed. Businesses need to separate contracted demand from announced capacity before committing. That is Fractionova’s interpretation of the reports.
Fractionova brings AI-native Opportunity Intelligence and principal-led judgement to cross-border decisions: which projects and partners to pursue, what structure to use and what to commit locally, for businesses working between India, the Gulf and other markets.
The WTO finds Gulf trade moving to ports outside the Strait of Hormuz. What rerouting, lasting costs and uneven demand mean for businesses selling into the Gulf.
Microsoft finds AI users in India and the UAE well ahead of the global average. What buyer readiness changes, and does not, for suppliers entering.
Deloitte finds 77% of companies weigh where an AI solution comes from. What sovereign AI changes for cross-border sales, local partners and market entry.
A route to commit to. A partner to qualify. A contract to structure. A border rule to test.
Start with what you are considering, what is at stake and what you need to determine.
Sources and notes. The corridor proposals, the subsea power links, the port, rail and trade figures, the green hydrogen and ammonia findings, and the financing and governance recommendations are from Mannat Jaspal, Leigh Mante and Cauvery Ganapathy, The Hormuz Inflection: Energy Security and Connectivity Networks in the Middle East, ORF Middle East (October 2026), pages 10, 13, 15, 19 to 20, 24, 27 to 28, 37, 41 to 42, 62 to 65 and 70. India’s import exposure, import costs, reserves, the May 2026 agreements with the UAE, Oman and the policy agenda are from Vikash Ranjan, Sushil Kumar and Pranshu Priyadarshi Birthal, India’s Energy Security Challenges Amidst the West Asian Crisis and the Way Forward, RIS Discussion Paper 351 (October 2026), pages 5 to 6, 8 to 10, 17, 19 to 20 and 23. India’s policy response, rerouting, growth forecasts and risks are from the World Bank, India Development Update (October 2026; data as of 15 September 2026), pages 5 to 6, 9 and 24 to 26. Figures from different publishers are not combined. Fractionova is not affiliated with ORF Middle East, the Observer Research Foundation, RIS or the World Bank.
Fractionova equips clients with intelligence and considered recommendations to inform their decisions. Investment and implementation decisions remain with the client; execution and outcomes depend on the organisations involved and prevailing conditions.