Three of 233
Of the 233 data centres operating across the Gulf, three were affected by the strikes of 1 March. Some workloads were rerouted, and in Soliman’s words the system absorbed the strikes.
Middle East Institute, September 2026, pp. 27, 29

Data centres and the Gulf
The conflict that began in the Gulf on 28 February 2026 has cost lives across the region, and it has reached the region’s digital infrastructure. On 1 March, Iranian drones struck two Amazon Web Services data centres in the UAE and damaged a third in Bahrain, according to the Middle East Institute. Yet the build-out continued: by MEI’s count, three of the Gulf’s 233 operating data centres were affected, and major partnerships said they would proceed.
What changed is the brief. A Gulf data centre now has to be protected, sited with care, backed up elsewhere and delivered fast. For the companies that supply, build and use that capacity, those requirements raise decisions about specification, buyers, origin and local presence. Those are the decisions to which Fractionova brings AI-native Opportunity Intelligence and principal-led judgement.
This perspective draws on the Middle East Institute’s The Middle East Beyond the Iran War (September 2026), in particular Mohammed Soliman’s essay on Gulf AI, with the World Bank’s October 2026 Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan Economic Update, the IMF’s October 2026 Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia and an Atlantic Council policy brief (September 2026). Facts and judgements are attributed to their authors; the interpretation is Fractionova’s. Fractionova is not affiliated with the Middle East Institute, the World Bank, the IMF or the Atlantic Council.
The strikes made data centres targets. They did not stop the build-out.
MEI’s Mohammed Soliman writes that the strikes highlighted a new reality: data centres have become targets in wars between states, a shift that began with Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure.
Of the 233 data centres operating across the Gulf, three were affected by the strikes of 1 March. Some workloads were rerouted, and in Soliman’s words the system absorbed the strikes.
Middle East Institute, September 2026, pp. 27, 29
Within a week, Brookfield confirmed that its US$20 billion AI infrastructure partnership with the Qatar Investment Authority would proceed on schedule, and Abu Dhabi said publicly that it was not scaling back. Soliman expects the Gulf to recalibrate how data centres are designed and sited, rather than whether they get built.
Middle East Institute, September 2026, p. 29
In July, the US Commerce Department moved the UAE into Country Group A:5, its most trusted export-control tier. Advanced computing chips go licence-free only to approved entities: UAE government agencies, G42, Core42 and eight US-headquartered AI companies. As a condition of US chip-export approvals, G42 and Saudi Arabia’s Humain were required to phase out Huawei equipment.
Middle East Institute, September 2026, pp. 28, 30
Soliman points to capital, power and proximity. Building a gigawatt of compute costs US$30 billion to US$50 billion, and few actors outside China can deliver both the power and the capital at that scale. Round-trip latency from the Gulf to users in South Asia is about 25 to 40 milliseconds, against 150 to 200 from the US East Coast.
Middle East Institute, September 2026, p. 30
A note on the sources: the Middle East Institute’s report is a collection of essays by its fellows, and the views are the authors’. Some figures in Soliman’s essay, including the latency estimates and the cost model below, are drawn from other studies. Fractionova takes no position on the conflict or on US export policy.
The World Bank and the IMF describe a build-out that is large, concentrated and led by the state.
The World Bank finds investment in data centres in the region concentrated in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the only economies in the region on the TOP500 list of supercomputers. MEI puts near-term compute plans across the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar at 8 to 10 gigawatts.
World Bank, MENAAP Economic Update, October 2026, pp. 33, 97
Sovereign wealth funds are the main engine behind compute, data centres and models: HUMAIN, owned by Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund, and MGX in Abu Dhabi, founded with Mubadala and G42. They can absorb early risk, but the World Bank warns that sovereign capital can favour selected firms and crowd out private investment.
World Bank, MENAAP Economic Update, October 2026, pp. 95–96
The IMF reports that Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE announced AI-related investments of roughly US$120 billion in 2025, more than 5% of GDP, with most of it in data centres and AI infrastructure.
IMF, Regional Economic Outlook, October 2026, p. 17
By number of facilities, the World Bank finds that the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan host just 1.9% of the world’s data centres. Beyond the two leaders, Oman has a US$5 billion semiconductor initiative and Morocco a US$1.2 billion AI compute project running on renewable power.
World Bank, MENAAP Economic Update, October 2026, pp. 97, 99
Taken together, the reports describe a changed brief rather than a smaller one.
For suppliers, the last point matters most. Where delay costs more than construction, the ability to deliver, install and repair quickly in the region becomes part of what is being bought. In energy, Saudi Aramco has suggested that localising the procurement of materials and components was a major factor in how quickly it responded to attacks (Colby Connelly, MEI).
A finding matters commercially when it is connected to a specific business. For a company that supplies equipment, systems or services to Gulf data centres, these are the questions Fractionova would put first, organised by the dimension of the opportunity they affect.
Technology & capability
Buyers are designing for protection, redundancy and fast repair. Equipment that can be duplicated, protected and restored quickly answers the new brief.
Does our product meet what a Gulf data-centre buyer now specifies for resilience, and can we show it?
Customer demand
The World Bank finds investment concentrated in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and MEI puts near-term plans at 8 to 10 gigawatts across those two and Qatar.
Which programmes and sites should we pursue first, and which can wait?
Partners & counterparties
The build-out runs through a small number of sovereign-backed vehicles and US technology companies. Most suppliers will reach them through the contractors that design and build for them.
Which buyers and contractors should we qualify, and how do we reach them?
Economics & commercial potential
In the model Soliman cites, delay and war costs remove an Emirati data centre’s lifecycle advantage over the US, yet speed of delivery matters more than either.
What would it cost us to deliver, install and service faster in the region, and would buyers pay for it?
Policy & geostrategic conditions
US chip approvals came with conditions on the buyers, including phasing out Huawei equipment. We expect suppliers to face similar questions about the origin of their own products and components; that is our inference, not a finding of the reports. Our perspective on sovereign AI examines where origin now decides access.
Will our components and supply chain pass the origin and compliance checks these programmes apply?
Timing & market readiness
Strikes, export rules and expectations of AI can all change the pace. In IMF staff analysis cited in its regional outlook, a reassessment of AI-related productivity gains would reduce GCC output by about 1% over two years.
What should we commit locally now, and what should wait for firmer orders?
The reports are useful evidence and an incomplete basis for a supplier’s decision. Four limits matter.
Those gaps are where a supplier’s decision is made: in specifications, buyers, contractors, origin and the economics of a local presence.
Bring the question in the form your board would ask it.
Is our product ready for what Gulf data-centre buyers now specify?
Which AI campus programmes and contractors should we pursue first?
Should we assemble, stock or service locally in Saudi Arabia or the UAE?
Will our supply chain pass the origin checks these programmes now apply?
This is a hypothetical illustration, not a client engagement or a claim of achieved outcomes.
An Indian maker of busway and low-voltage switchgear systems supplies data centres at home. Two contractors building AI campuses in the Gulf have asked it to quote, and both stress delivery dates, spares on site and the origin of components. Leadership needs to decide how to serve the region before committing capital there.
Fractionova’s AI engine would connect the programmes and contractors in each market with their specifications, origin and compliance requirements, delivery and service expectations, local participation rules and the economics of each route. Principal-led review would establish which route supports the next commitment and what evidence would justify it.
Supply through the contractorsShip from India and let the contractors install. The questions are lead times, spares and whether buyers will accept that service model.
Assemble and hold spares in Saudi ArabiaCarry out final assembly and keep a spares stock near the largest programmes. The questions are volumes, local participation rules and the capital at risk.
Build a service-and-spares hub in the UAEServe several campuses from one regional base. The questions are response times, which markets it can reach and who staffs it.
You do not need to choose a format first. The starting point is the decision your business needs to make.
Concentrated intelligence for a consequential choice.
A focused investigation around a defined decision, culminating in a decision brief with the recommended direction, unresolved questions and conditions for commitment.
For example: Decide whether to supply the Gulf AI build-out from India, assemble in Saudi Arabia or set up a UAE service hub.
A coordinated mandate to develop market access and commercial relationships.
An integrated investigation into market priorities, entry structures and counterparties, with prioritised partners and preparation for engagement.
For example: Qualify the programmes and contractors building AI campuses in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and prepare engagement.
A retained intelligence capability around your strategic agenda.
Recurring investigation and monitoring, supported by agreed business context and structured principal-led reviews.
For example: Track Gulf data-centre programmes, export-control changes and security developments as the build-out proceeds.
Each engagement is commissioned against a defined business objective. Scope and fees reflect the analytical depth, market coverage, counterparty work and continuity required.
Founder & Principal Prabha Shankar leads the technical-commercial judgement behind Fractionova’s work. An engineer and international business specialist, he brings nearly three decades of experience across automotive engineering management, advanced mobility, new energy, international market development and complex programme execution.
At Fractionova, that experience shapes the questions put to the AI engine, the assumptions challenged during investigation and the commercial significance assigned to its findings.
Yes. According to the Middle East Institute, Iranian drones struck two Amazon Web Services data centres in the UAE on 1 March 2026 and damaged a third in Bahrain. MEI reports that three of the 233 data centres operating across the Gulf were affected.
Not according to MEI. Brookfield confirmed that its US$20 billion AI infrastructure partnership with the Qatar Investment Authority would proceed on schedule, and Abu Dhabi said it was not scaling back. MEI’s Mohammed Soliman expects the Gulf to change how data centres are designed and sited rather than whether they are built.
The IMF reports that Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE announced roughly US$120 billion of AI-related investment in 2025, mostly in data centres and AI infrastructure. MEI puts near-term compute plans across the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar at 8 to 10 gigawatts.
Resilience, speed of delivery and the origin of components now weigh alongside price. Suppliers that can deliver, install and service quickly in the region, and pass buyers’ compliance checks, are better placed. That is Fractionova’s interpretation of the reports.
Fractionova brings AI-native Opportunity Intelligence and principal-led judgement to cross-border decisions: which programmes and buyers to pursue, which partners to engage and what local presence to build, for businesses working between India, the Gulf and other markets.
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A specification to meet. A buyer to qualify. A local presence to test. A supply chain to check.
Start with what you are considering, what is at stake and what you need to determine.
Sources and notes. Accounts of the strikes and of the build-out’s response, the July export-control rule, and the cost, capacity and latency figures are from the Middle East Institute, The Middle East Beyond the Iran War (September 2026): Mohammed Soliman, “Gulf AI: The War as a Catalyst for Deepening Regional-US Strategic Tech Cooperation”, pages 27 to 32; Daniel Benaim, “Gulf: The War Has Shaken Relations With Washington”, page 25; Colby Connelly, “Gulf Energy Markets: The Region’s Edge Will Survive, At a Price”, page 35; Karen E. Young, “Gulf Political Economy: The Cost of Accommodating Iran”, page 38. The lifecycle cost model and the latency figures are cited by Soliman from other studies. Investment concentration, sovereign funds, the TOP500 ranking, the share of data centres (by number of facilities, from PeeringDB, June 2026) and national programmes are from the World Bank, From Divide to Opportunity: AI, Jobs, and Growth, Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan Economic Update (October 2026), pages 33 and 95 to 99. The 2025 investment figure and the AI downside scenario are from the IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia (October 2026), chapter 1, pages 12 and 17. The argument for redundancy across borders is from Jeff Lightfoot, The strategic rationale for closer investment ties between Europe and the Gulf, Atlantic Council and Europe Gulf Forum policy brief (September 2026), pages 2 and 3. Investment figures from different publishers differ in scope and are not combined. Fractionova is not affiliated with the Middle East Institute, the World Bank, the IMF or the Atlantic Council.
Fractionova equips clients with intelligence and considered recommendations to inform their decisions. Investment and implementation decisions remain with the client; execution and outcomes depend on the organisations involved and prevailing conditions.